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MIGRATION AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTION TRENDS AND POLICIES  
AND THE URBAN FUTURE

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## CONTENTS

### I. OVERVIEW

### II. CITYWARD MIGRATION IN THE THIRD WORLD:

#### POLICIES AND PROSPECTS

#### A. Perception of Issue and Goals

#### B. Policies to Limit Growth of Major Cities

##### 1. Restricting In-Migration

- a) Limiting new job creation
- b) Limiting new housing
- c) Food rationing
- d) Restricting urban services
- e) Restricting access to cities

##### 2. Dispersion Strategies

- a) Creating "growth poles"
- b) Promoting "counter-magnets"
- c) Building new capitals and towns
- d) Land colonization
- e) Promoting intermediate cities and small towns

##### 3. Regional and Rural Development

- a) Regional development
- b) Rural development

##### 4. Summary Evaluation of Policies to Limit Major City Growth

#### C. Policies to Deal with the Growth of Major Cities

#### D. Future Directions: Postive Impacts of Urban Growth

III. URBAN POPULATION ISSUES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

- A. Nature of Urban Population Problems in the North
- B. Continued Urbanization/Rural Decline
  - 1. Policies to Restrict In-Migration to Cities
  - 2. Policies to Stem the Decline of Rural Areas
- C. Regional Imbalances
  - 1. Stimulation of Growth in Depressed Regions
- D. Suburban Growth/Declining Central Cities
  - 1. Programs to Reduce Urban Poverty
  - 2. Economic Development Effects
  - 3. Physical Renewal of Cities
  - 4. Neighborhood Revitalization Programs
- E. Population Turnaround/New Rural Growth

IV. NORTH/SOUTH LINKAGES

- A. Linkages
- B. Conclusions

## I. OVERVIEW

"Population and the urban future" conveys different images to city officials and planners in North America and Europe than it does to those in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Population trends are radically different -- to some extent, even the reverse -- between the industrialized and developing countries (called here for convenience the North and South).

Urban planners and policy makers face a world in which the population is increasing by over 200,000 people a day. How can they apprehend the fact that by the end of this century 1.2 billion people will be added to the global population? Over half of this population increase will be in urban areas mostly in the Third World. This tremendous urban growth would require building the equivalent of a city the size of Lima, Peru every forty days between now and the year 2000 in order to accommodate the increase.

While cities in the industrialized countries are facing stabilizing or even declining populations in the developing countries an estimated 75,000 people, mostly poor and seeking better employment opportunities, stream into the cities from the countryside. Many end in shantytowns, peripheral satellite towns or inner city slums where even basic amenities are lacking. In 1980, about 177 million people in urban centers in the developing world lacked safe drinking water and 331 million were without adequate sanitation.<sup>1</sup>

Yet in many of these cities, alongside the shantytowns and informal economy, is a modern city connected by communications, transportation, capital flows, labour mobility, and even life-style into a worldwide urban network (see Figure 1:). A global economy interconnects the major cities of the South with those of the North. In many of the cities of the North, alongside the centers of wealth and power, there exists poverty, substandard housing, malnutrition, high infant mortality rates, and related features often associated with the cities of the Third World.

This paper starts with the recognition that the fate of North and South are inexorably linked. The March 25, 1986, New York Times headline proclaimed that the "World Bank Plans \$1.5 Billion in New Aid to Latin Debtors"-- a tangible measure of the close interdependence of North/South futures.

New communication and information technologies are making possible vast decentralization of city functions in both developed and developing countries and opening the doors to a new level of co-ordination and integration between rural and urban sectors and across nations in the global economy. A profound restructuring is

occurring in cities worldwide. In the North as well as the South, policy makers will need to bring both vision and flexibility to the task of transforming these present-day cities into the cities of the future.

This paper reviews the record of both industrialized and developing countries in trying to alter patterns of internal migration. The first section of the paper reviews attempts of the South to stem the growth of large cities through: 1) restricting in-migration; 2) dispersion; and 3) regional and rural development strategies and to accommodate to it through a new approach to housing and employment. The second part of the paper focusses on the developed world, examining the different nature of urban population problems there and evaluating policies that have been employed by Northern governments to address these problems. The economic and demographic forces that link the urban future in both regions, along with a related set of policy recommendations, are discussed in the final section.

The fundamental conclusion of this paper is that in both developed and developing countries policy interventions are rarely effective, no matter what their particular character, unless they act in a direction parallel to the major prevailing economic and social forces at play in the country. In cases where they are introduced for the purpose of acting against the underlying trends, at best they can serve to buffer and ameliorate those trends. Frequently, however, because of the great scale of intervention required, substantial wastage of government resources occurs.

In the developing countries, the record is fairly conclusive that spatial distribution policies to date have not been effective and have sometimes even been counterproductive, stimulating increased cityward migration rather than stemming the tide. Even if the currently favoured strategies of promoting small and intermediate sized cities meet with success, there will still be over 50 Third World cities with 4 million people or more by the year 2000 accounting for one-quarter of the entire urban population.

For these reasons, we propose that future efforts to plan for the urban future focus less on modifying population trends than accommodating them. Planners and policy makers need to recognize the realities of urban growth and urban deconcentration in the North and to apply their scarce managerial and financial resources to meeting these challenges rather than to preserving their cities in the forms of the past.

## II. CITYWARD MIGRATION IN THE THIRD WORLD: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS

All policies are grounded in goals and in the way issues are perceived. These vary greatly between regions, countries, cities, political administrations and time periods. The noteworthy factor, therefore, is not disparity but convergence. The alarm among

developing countries in the post-World War II period about the "urban explosion" and the widespread objective of stemming the growth of the primate cities was almost universal.

Section A which follows addresses the perception of the problem and the goals as seen by the various governments of the developing countries. Section B deals specifically with the policies used to limit growth of major cities; Section C explores policies that accommodate to urban growth; and Section D concludes with the positive impacts of urbanization.

#### A. Perception of Issue and Goals\*

While scholars have for years debated whether rapid population growth in the major third world cities is a blessing or curse for the future of their countries, governments of these countries have been almost unanimous: the vast majority of them perceive it to be a problem demanding government intervention. These perceptions are held regardless of factors specific to each country such as the absolute levels of city growth, national spatial distribution of population, the level of economic development, income distribution among geographic areas, current political climate, and political ideology.

Perceptions have also been shaped by the commonly-held belief that newly-arrived migrants are socially disorganized, economically unproductive, culturally maladapted to urban life and politically disruptive. They are frequently seen as "marginal" elements who put pressure on already overextended public services in urban areas but are unable or unwilling to pay for these services. Furthermore, they are often considered a threat to urban, and even national stability, since the "frustrated expectations" that are widely attributed to them are presumed to lead to aggression and radicalism directed against the establishment. This view of new urbanites was especially widespread in the 1960s and 1970s. It has only now slowly subsided, particularly since a number of studies have disputed the stereotypical image of the migrant and shown how policies derived from these erroneous stereotypes have often created self-fulfilling prophecies bringing about the precise problems they sought to overcome.<sup>3</sup>

Still, the universality of this perception -- of a "primate city growth" problem -- throughout the developing world deserves emphasis. According to the U.N., 13 of 23 Asian governments which responded to a recent U.N. inquiry expressed their desire to reduce the growth of their primate city, primarily by curbing rural-to-urban migration<sup>4</sup>. These included not only the classical high urban population/low

\* This section was prepared with the research assistance of Martin Brockerhoff.

economic growth states but also states with high rates of economic growth (e.g., in Southeast Asia) and low rates of urbanization (e.g., India). In Africa, 33 of 51 respondents indicated the same desire. The crucial determinants of the perception in Africa are the current rates of primate city growth (which are the highest in the world), the low levels of economic growth and often the colonial legacy of primate-city commercial and political dominance. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 23 of 31 states want to reduce primate city growth -- a higher proportion than in other continents -- including countries with relatively low levels of primacy (e.g., Brazil and Colombia). This probably reflects the high overall level of urbanization throughout the continent. Only among the Middle Eastern countries is primacy not viewed as a crucial policy concern, due mainly to the high levels of economic growth in most states in recent years and the belief that expanding economies can accommodate growing populations. In sum, primate city growth is a major concern of third-world governments.

At the World Population Conference in 1974, the issue of internal migration and urban growth received scant attention. Far more concern was shown for natural increase and fertility in developing countries. Today, however, internal migration and natural increase are recognised to play an almost equal role in urban population growth and therefore have become equal policy concerns.

In many developing countries, this perception has been translated into strategies to curb an urban growth which focus both on restricting cityward migration and curbing natural increase. Table I presents an illustrative overview of migration and natural increase policies in selected developing countries that possess clearly defined, longstanding policies of both kinds. It indicates that migration and natural increase policies have usually been compatible in attempting to curb urban growth. It also highlights the extent to which some governments have modified their policies in recent years to focus more on rural development and the dispersion of population to small and intermediate cities rather than on purely restrictive measures.

#### B. Policies to Limit Growth of Major Cities

As a consequence of the widespread perception that "hyper-urbanization" or "over-urbanization" was occurring in the major cities of developing countries, a variety of policies have been promoted to reduce urban population growth. In Asia and Africa, this has meant primarily curbing rural-to-urban migration. In Latin America, more concern has been expressed with readjusting the existing rural-urban population distribution, since most countries there are already highly urbanized.



Looking over the myriad of policy approaches to limiting urban growth, one can clearly identify three distinct strategies:

1. restricting in-migration -- policies designed to make it difficult for migrants to enter and/or establish permanent residence or establish new businesses in urban areas.
2. dispersion -- policies aimed at attracting potential migrants to other areas, including "growth poles" or new capitals, small and intermediate cities or remote resettlement areas.
3. regional and rural development -- policies focussed on improving rural conditions sufficiently to keep people "on the land" and to reduce their incentives for cityward migration.

Each of these strategies has many variations, as will be discussed below. An evaluation of each strategy, as practiced since the 1950s in many developing countries, reveals that they have had differing degrees of impact in curbing rural-to-urban migration in various cities but that none -- at the time of this writing -- could be considered an unqualified success. Table II lists the types and locations of the policies described in this paper, highlighting selected countries as representative cases from each geographic area.

We will now examine each of these strategies in turn, looking at the rationale behind them, where they were tried, and what effect they had to the extent evaluation is possible.

### 1. Restricting In-Migration

The "Urban explosion" of the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in Latin America, came as a shock to many governments. There had been no precedent for the massive numbers of people that flocked to the cities during those decades. In Brazil, during that period, for example, one out of every five people left the countryside to come to the city.<sup>7</sup> By the 1970s the squatter population represented 25 to 70% of the population in most big cities, and was growing at four to five times the rate of the rest of the city.<sup>8</sup>

Urban services were clearly inadequate for these people -- most of their dwellings had no running water, no piped sewage, no electricity, and were often built precariously of highly flammable materials. Squatter settlements were seen as an inhuman way to live as well as an eyesore to the urban elite. The metaphor often used for shanty towns was that of a growing tumor or cancer on the healthy urban body and the response was to keep it from growing further ("closed-city" policy) and to "cut-out" what was there (squatter removal). These policies allowed city governments to respond immediately and dramatically to the perceived problem, even where national policies were not yet ready to address the root causes of cityward migration. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, squatter removal was carried out in many cities. Over time, however, governments began to encounter both economic and political limits to this approach and were forced to rethink their strategy.

Policies restricting in-migration have taken on a variety of forms, from mild disincentives to stronger levels of control. They include limiting new job creation or housing, rationing food, restricting urban services and devising restrictive barriers to entrance into the city including passports, passes and permits. A brief critique of each follows.

a) Limiting New Job Creation

Attempts to discourage urban in-migration by limiting the creation of new jobs is perhaps the most "benign" of the restrictive strategies, insofar as it usually places limits on new construction and investment by industries and business in metropolitan areas, rather than directly targeting individuals. Typically these limits have involved zoning regulations, taxation increases, the establishment of green belts which are "off limits" to residential or industrial development, and the use of construction and operating permits and licenses. They have been used by a wide assortment of Third-World countries including free market systems (e.g., India) and centrally-planned (e.g., China, Cuba, Algeria). (Among the developed nations, similar restrictions on urban industrial and commercial have been widely employed. See Section III). Some countries have even placed direct limits on the number of jobs in cities. In China and Cuba, for instance, urban jobs are scarce compared with the demand and are often allocated as rewards or favours, and urban dwellers were frequently assigned to work in medium-sized or small towns in the countryside, although this policy has recently changed. The rationale behind limiting new job creation, related to the Harris-Todaro theory of induced migration, is that by limiting formal sector employment growth in cities, potential migrants will be deterred from moving by the decreased likelihood that they will find work in cities.<sup>9</sup>

b) Limiting New Housing

This approach is more directly targeted at individuals. Restrictions are placed on housing availability in cities by forbidding new construction, selectivity allocating existing units, raising prices or restrictive land zoning. These measures have been widely used in all developing countries, particularly by centrally-planned countries (and by centrally-planned countries in the North, as well). Significant examples include Cuba's use of zoning laws and slower urban housing construction to reduce the growth of Havana in the 1960s and 1970s, and The Republic of Korea's imposition of higher residential taxes in Seoul than in other urban areas.<sup>10</sup>

c) Food Rationing

This approach has been infrequently used in "free-market" developing countries, but has been officially used in some centrally-planned economies, such as China, where rice rations were issued in a place-specific fashion so that even if one could get into the cities, one could not obtain food there and had to share the allotment of a friend or relative.

d) Restricting Urban Services

Governments have not been adverse to using their control over essential services as a means of keeping rural migrants out of cities. An often-cited example is the case of Manila in the 1960s when free education was provided only to proven residents until administrative costs and corruption undermined this approach; User charges for public services in cities have also been attempted. Notable cases are the fees charged for water use in Mexico City and in Jakarta.

e) Restricting Access to Cities

The most visible policies involve the use of identity cards, passports, registration requirements and control over transportation to deny migrants access to cities. Indonesia attempted an ambitious registration policy in the 1970s to keep migrants out of Jakarta which met with limited success and was dropped. These restrictive measures are frequently accompanied with police checkpoints between rural and urban areas, and they are usually extremely costly.

Although there are difficulties with trying to quantify the impact of each of these policy approaches (since other variables may have affected rural-to-urban migration levels in each area), one can conclude that in the majority of countries the impact of these approaches to limit cityward migration has been at best only partially effective, and in most cases has had little success whatsoever. In reviewing the experiences of the many attempts, what emerges is another issue of perception -- that of the migrants themselves. They perceive (and correctly so) greater choice, opportunity and hope for the future in the city and will often go to great lengths to fulfill these dreams. In the free-market economies, this means building by night if prohibited by day. In the centrally-planned economies, it means finding ways to bypass job permits and ration cards and share food and apartments. In the face of such willful behaviour, it is doubtful that a government can significantly curb cityward migration through a purely restrictive strategy.

In addition to this very basic human drive, five other reasons indicate why restricting in-migration has proven so ineffective in curbing urban growth:

1. It is fundamentally too costly to enforce, politically, economically and administratively.
2. Closed-city measures seldom receive sustained government commitment. They are usually short-term, reactive responses to what is perceived as an immediate threat.
3. Measures usually have insufficient co-ordination between levels of government. Cities often begin them without central government support and fail to ever secure this support.

4. There is a demand for migrants in urban areas. Informal sector services are needed in major urban areas and migrants satisfy this demand.
5. Urban-oriented measures don't address rural poverty, i.e., the "push factor" in rural-to-urban migration, and do not contend with the fact that economic opportunities continue to be significantly greater in the cities.

Indeed, restricting in-migration has been a counter-productive strategy in some countries where it has been attempted. In India, for instance, while scarce public funds have been spent to deter cityward migration, migrants continue to flock to Calcutta at the same time that formal sector employment declines and public services deteriorate.<sup>11</sup> Recent studies indicate that many countries seem to have dropped or modified this strategy in recent years, recognizing its cost and lack of success. In China, explicit attempts to restrict migration to cities have been largely abandoned in favour of policies to develop medium-sized cities and small towns, and the urban classification has been extended to areas formerly classified as rural in an attempt to indicate greater development.<sup>12</sup> India's policy of limiting the growth of manufacturing in cities in the 1950s and 1960s has in the 1980s become overshadowed by more rural-focussed attempts to curb cityward migration.<sup>13</sup>

A corollary to the restriction of in-migration has been squatter removal or "slum clearance." This policy often involving bulldozers, burning of shantytowns and forced transport of squatters to the urban periphery, has elsewhere been incorrectly categorized as part of the "closed-city" strategy.<sup>14</sup> It was not intended to prevent people from migrating to urban areas (although that may have been the message) but simply to remove existing urban squatters from the city core. Since, in most cases, these migrants were relocated in a more peripheral location within the metropolitan area (either in other shantytowns or in public housing), the policies did nothing to limit or reduce primate city growth, merely redirected it within the urban boundaries.

Slum clearance was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s in many cities (e.g., Manila, Lima, Rio de Janeiro) but has now been largely abandoned. Rondenelli and Cheema have described how slum clearance has ended in several Asian cities -- Manila, Madras, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur -- and been replaced with efforts to upgrade squatter settlements.<sup>15</sup> The case of squatter removal in Rio de Janeiro in the 1960s and 1970s clearly reveals why this approach to slowing urban growth has not worked. People whose homes were bulldozed or burned down were often put into garbage trucks and literally dumped on the outskirts of Rio. Having no viable alternative, they came back to the city and squatted elsewhere. People removed and relocated to low-cost housing on the city periphery generally defaulted on their monthly payments because their family incomes dropped dramatically after the move from the city core. In the end, the government lost vast sums in non-recoverable housing costs, and removal efforts became too expensive as an approach to slowing urban growth.<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Dispersion

Dispersion strategies are based on the rationale that if migrants cannot be kept out of metropolitan areas through restrictive policies perhaps they can be directed to other places, such as smaller cities or new towns. They are based on a more sophisticated understanding of migration motives than the restrictive policies insofar as they acknowledge that the potential migrants will not be easily deterred from coming to the metropolitan area unless some other area is made equally attractive as a destination. This entails creating attractive "magnets" of growth, featuring jobs, new industry and affordable housing in areas outside the major cities. Dispersion strategies do not resist the urbanization trend but only try to direct its development to areas other than the largest cities, so that a greater spatial balance of population can be achieved.

Dispersion strategies are very much in vogue today in developing countries. At least one policy of migrant dispersion has been employed in 19 of 23 Asian countries, in 44 of 51 African states and in all Latin American and Middle Eastern states except El Salvador and Lebanon.<sup>17</sup> Although dispersion has been moderately successful in some developed countries (e.g., in Eastern Europe; see Section III B and C below), it has not always effectively curbed cityward migration in developing states.

Five distinct dispersion policies have been used by developing countries. These are: a) creating "growth poles;" b) promoting "counter-magnets"; c) building new capitals and towns; d) land colonization and border region development; and e) promoting intermediate cities and small towns.

### a) Creating "Growth Poles"

This policy was one of great promise in the 1960s and 1970s but is now generally discredited. A "growth pole" is an urban area where economic development is promoted through investment and industrialization and intend to create jobs and attract potential migrants. While the policies may have succeeded in developing new urban centers to counter primate city economic dominance (e.g., Tacila (near Rawalpindi), Pakistan and Belo Horizonte, Brazil) they did not succeed in reducing the flow of migrants to metropolitan areas. Nor did they create the desired "spread effects" to rural hinterland areas. This is partly because the growth pole policy has received only halfhearted government support (e.g., Chile and Brazil in the 1960s). As Simmons notes, many governments have discovered that creating growth poles is extremely expensive, requiring investments in infrastructure which are beyond their capacity. In addition, small industries have been reluctant to move from metropolitan areas where their inputs and markets are located<sup>18</sup>, and new cities cannot provide the needed forward and backward linkages. Finally, the use of capital-intensive technology has often increased local unemployment and consequently cityward migration. For all these reasons, growth poles have not proved to be the panacea they were once envisioned to be.

b) Promoting "Counter-Magnets"

Counter-magnets are based on a similar rationale as growth poles and are still very much in fashion. The policy involves building up the existing second or third largest urban center in the country (e.g., Cali, Colombia or Pusan, Republic of Korea). This is, however, not a viable policy option for some developing countries since they have no secondary city of importance (e.g., Thailand, where Bangkok is at least 46 times larger than the next largest city).

c) Building New Capitals and Towns

A number of developing countries have attempted to build new towns or capital cities. Brasilia (Brazil), Islamabad (Pakistan), Dodoma (Tanzania), Abuja (Nigeria), Chandigar (India) and other new capitals have all been intended in large part to curb the growth of the primate cities. Even where they have shown some success in building up undeveloped regions, they have not drastically impacted the growth of major cities, and they have often resulted in new urban problems. For example, the creation of Brasilia had a questionable impact on reducing the flow of migrants to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The cost of building up an urban infrastructure from scratch and moving all government functions is enormous. This is perhaps one reason why the planned new capitals in Tanzania and Nigeria are proceeding so slowly. Communications diseconomies may also result when the capital city is far removed from the primate city, particularly when legislators refuse to relinquish the urban amenities and end up commuting to work, as they did for more than a decade between Rio and Brasilia. The creation of new towns faces the similar constraint of cost and is politically viable only for the more wealthy developing states (e.g., it has been a main focus of investment in many Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates).

d) Land Colonization and Border Region Development

Resettlement policies are intended to "open up" under-utilized land. Land colonization policies may involve a range in the degree of voluntary choice and various levels of incentives. Like many other migration policies we have reviewed, but particularly with these policies, slowing cityward migration may be only a partial and secondary objective. Regional stabilization, security and economic development are generally the main goals. Both land colonization and border region development policies are widely used: land colonization in about one-third of Asian and African countries and two-thirds of Latin American states (especially, Amazon area and southern cone).<sup>19</sup> However, the impact has been a mixed success. The new settlements often present major survival difficulties for the relocated families in terms of climate, soil for cultivation, life style, and costs. Although many of the projects offer some subsidies and/or relocation stipends, they are often insufficient; and many families end up returning to their former place of residence.

There is often a lack of long-term government support; and in some cases, even with government commitment, the absolute number of people relocated is quite small. Indonesia's transmigration program illustrates the difficulties involved with this approach.<sup>20</sup> Although resettling the poorest groups of Jakarta's population on the outer islands has been a national priority since 1969, progress has occurred only very slowly. Since 1969, over 3.5 million people have been removed from Java -- many from Jakarta -- but the island's population growth rate still increased in the 1970s and Jakarta's 1990 population is expected to be twice that of 1975.<sup>21</sup>

e) Promoting Intermediate Cities and Small Towns

As a result of problems associated with the aforementioned dispersion policies, the governments of many developing countries have now adopted the promotion of small and intermediate cities as the favoured dispersion policy.<sup>22</sup> The U.N.'s 1983 Monitoring Report reveals that this approach is currently used in almost all Asian and Middle Eastern countries and in about one-half of African and Latin American countries. It has also become the central focus of China's migration policy in the 1980s.<sup>23</sup> Intermediate cities and small towns are usually defined very broadly. They may have population of one thousand or one hundred thousand. Promoting them is believed to have three major advantages: 1. the creation of multiple economic-rural-urban linkages; 2. the savings of building upon the existing physical and social infrastructure in cities and towns; and 3. the focus on social (rather than exclusively industrial) infrastructure development. This broader focus is expected to decrease the rural-urban gap, and thereby reduce the non-economic motives for rural out-migration.

It is difficult to assess whether the promotion of intermediate cities and small towns has curbed cityward migration to date, or whether it will in the future since this is a fairly recently adopted approach in many developing countries and since cause and effect are difficult to ascertain in such cases. The question is whether some countries are "spreading themselves thin" by promoting many small cities that may only minimally affect migration patterns (or may even create more demand for big city migration), rather than devoting more resources to the concentrated development of fewer major urban areas. Observation in many cases has shown that once people adapt to the life-style of small towns or intermediate cities their increased knowledge and skills and the facilitated communication and transportation network makes it more attractive and less difficult to migrate to the primate city. This problem has not received adequate discussion in the recent literature promoting this strategy.

The lack of sufficient public investment resources that plagues most developing states may also make an ambitious and potentially comprehensive policy such as this prohibitive in the long run.

However, Richardson argues that intermediate cities can potentially contribute to redirecting migrant flows away from primate cities and toward regional cities or towns if the selection of small cities is based on economic potential, the elimination of discriminatory spatial policies, and several support instruments including industrial incentives, investments in regional infrastructure and strengthening urban-rural connections.<sup>24</sup> It is too early to tell whether this strategy may yet prove a valuable tool in reducing cityward migration.

In sum, the evidence shows that most dispersion strategies as thus far conceived have not effectively reduced migration to major cities. Along with sharing many of the same underlying problems as the strategy of restricting in-migration -- prohibitive costs, lack of co-ordination between levels of government, lack of long-term government commitment -- the dispersion strategy has its own distinctive flaws. One obvious problem is that it frequently goes against the thrust of a country's national development policies and against patterns of urban primacy dictated by the international economy. Data across countries shows clear correlations between economic development levels and urban growth, particularly that of the primate cities. Thus, Mexico's limited success in promoting small cities in the 1970s occurred within the context of a free-market economic policy that promoted the economic advantages of Mexico City for potential migrants. The primate city pattern is in many cases a legacy of the economic strategy of the colonial period which has only recently ended for many countries. These deeply ingrained historical patterns are not easily overcome by government policies and have been made all the more compelling by the past decades of migration such that most people in rural areas and small towns by now have direct family of village ties to the primate city.

The other side of the dispersion problem is more immediate and includes the failure to provide the basic social infrastructure in the chosen areas and the difficulty of choosing appropriate locations needed for modern industry. Most small towns provide neither the forward or backward linkages needed for industries to survive, and the cost of importing not just the raw materials but component parts, of training and managing unskilled workers and/or exporting the product to sufficiently large markets makes many industries non-viable in such locations. Whether the promotion of intermediate cities and small towns can sufficiently overcome these problems so as to reduce cityward migration remains to be seen.

### 3. Regional and Rural Development

The strategy of trying to "keep them on the land" has gained enormous popularity over the past fifteen or twenty years as a means of slowing rural-to-urban migration and primate city growth. This has properly been labeled the most distinct Third-World strategy for dealing with cityward migration, since it is used in virtually every



developing country. Its guiding rationale is that by equalizing standards of living in the countryside and the city, the flow of migrants will be reduced. Thus it is based on the assumption that cityward migration is caused primarily by push factors including economic opportunity differentials and unequal access of social services. The two aspects -- negative development and rural development -- are closely related but each has a distinct focus and set of policy tools.

a) Regional Development

As defined here, regional development refers to policies targeted at a specific lagging region of a country with the objective of improving conditions there so as to retain current residents. It is not mainly a dispersion strategy, as some have categorized it.<sup>25</sup> Used in almost every developing country (and in virtually every developed country - see Section III C below), regional development is intended to "move work to the population" as a substitute for the rural population moving to urban areas to find work.

While some industry relocated in response to these incentives, overall regional development worsened due to the strong pull of the major cities and more industrialized regions to the south.

Few if any countries implement regional development programs for the primary purpose of altering population distribution patterns. Their main goal is to overcome economic problems in specific regions. It is, therefore, difficult to formally evaluate their effectiveness in preventing cityward migration per se. What is clear from the experience of most developing countries is the fact that regional development in areas of poor economic growth is extremely difficult to achieve. It is also clear that few Third World countries can sustain large-scale regional development programs over an extended period of time. Such programs demand a diversion of scarce public investment monies away from core areas of economic growth, areas which most developing countries regard as central to their prosperity and development. Therefore, regional development strategies are typically diluted in practice and of limited impact in retaining populations in rural areas.

An example in the 1960s in Brazil was the massive Northeast Development Agency, a national agency with funding for research and promotion of Northeast development. Tax incentives, subsidies, moving costs of industry, even of skilled labour were all available to help draw investment and jobs to the Northeast.

b) Rural Development

Along with the promotion of intermediate cities and small towns, regional and rural development has become the most important "preventive" approach to dealing with rural-to-urban migration.<sup>26</sup> When evaluating this approach, as in the case of regional development

efforts, it is important to note that rural development has many complementary objectives associated with improving the lives of the rural poor. Slowing rural out-migration is not in itself the primary motivation. The vast majority (over 90%) of multinational development aid (including World Bank assistance), has been spent on this rural and overall national development while urban development has received perhaps 8%.

The perceived connection behind rural development and rural out-migration is really quite simple: It is assumed that if rural employment is created, if income levels are raised, and if basic social services are provided, out-migration rates will drop and fertility rates will be reduced over time. Based on this logic, a wide variety of policies have been devised and implemented which are usually lumped together in discussions as the "integrated rural development strategy." Specific rural development measures intended to directly or indirectly modify rural-to-urban migration can be summarized as follows:

1. Effective Land Reform to change the distribution of productive assets.
2. Investment in Agricultural Production, including green revolution technologies (new seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and irrigation systems) to stimulate job creation.
3. Investment in Non-Agricultural Sectors, such as small-scale industries and public works, to create off-farm employment.
4. Creation of Small Urban Centers and Market Towns to provide rural services and ensure a market for agricultural produce.
5. Improving the Rural Infrastructure for small farmers through roads, dams and electrification to sustain the viability of their production.
6. Credit, Technical Assistance and Co-operatives for inputs, to lower cost and raise production for small farmers.
7. Providing Essential Services such as education, training and health services.

It is difficult to assess the impact of rural development measures on cityward migration since results have rarely been quantified and, as Findlay notes, integrated rural development has simply not been in existence for very long<sup>27</sup>. However, the migration implications of specific rural development measures can be identified. The summary by Richard Rhoda (Table 3) is an especially helpful discussion on the rural development/rural out-migration connection. Rhoda concludes that rural development measures must be examined individually and at each stage of a country's social and economic evolution to determine their probable impact on rural out-migration.

Overall, the evidence appears to suggest that on balance rural-urban migration probably has been stimulated by previous development projects in rural areas. It appears that some measures significantly curb rural out-migration at certain stages of their evolution (e.g., irrigation projects, credit and extension services to small farmers). However, these measures are seldom used in isolation; they are usually used in combination with other measures that tend to increase rural out-migration (e.g., formal education, road building, rural electrification, tractorization, etc.) In effect, rural development measures frequently offset one another in practice. In sum, one can expect that the integrated rural development strategy adopted by so many governments of developing countries will have a negligible effect on rural out-migration in the future.

The cases of China and Cuba in the 1960s are often cited as examples of rural development successfully slowing the pace of urbanization and rural out-migration.<sup>30</sup> These are atypical cases, however, in that rural development was accompanied in both countries by massive social and economic change and strong, nationally co-ordinated incentives. Most importantly, large-scale land reform took place, benefiting the poorest segments of the rural population. The rural development activities carried out by China -- large-scale land reform, the organization of work teams, fair agricultural pricing policies, the creation of small-scale industries and small towns -- would be difficult to implement in combination by a financially-pressed, non-centrally planned economy.

In the vast majority of developing countries, governments have far less institutional control and lack the resources required to implement such ambitious measures. More importantly, they are not in a position to carry out drastic social and economic restructuring without threatening their own stability. For these governments, a selective and more modest use of the measures outlined by Rhoda has been the norm. Under such circumstances, the potential of rural development measures to reduce rural-urban migration in developing countries in the future appears low.

#### 4. Summary Evaluation of Policies to Limit Major City Growth

After having surveyed the wide range of costly and mostly ineffective attempts to prevent migrants from coming to metropolitan areas in developing countries, it becomes clear that neither "sticks" to keep them out of cities nor "carrots" to attract them elsewhere are effective against the overwhelming forces of increased personal opportunity and nationwide economic development. Despite the promise of some policies, a number of specific problems need to be addressed by policy makers in developing countries. These include:

1. National resources are simply not large enough to reverse the structural economic forces that cause urbanization. Attempts to curb

urban growth therefore consume precious resources ineffectively and postpone the inevitable need to formulate more feasible strategies for accommodating urban growth.

2. Policies to control urban growth depend upon close co-ordination among municipal, regional and national decision makers. Most Third-World governments have been either unwilling or unable to produce such co-ordination.

3. It seems likely that the "pull factors" involved in rural-to-urban migration (i.e., the attractions of big cities which draw migrants to them) are of a magnitude to make any possible preventive strategies no more than modest successes even when "push" factors are mitigated.

4. Preventive strategies have been based on false assumptions about the nature of migrants in big cities. New urbanites have generally not been socially disorganized, or economically unproductive, and there is no empirical evidence proving that they have become politically radicalized and destabilizing.<sup>31</sup>

#### C. Policies to Deal with the Growth of Major Cities

Given the overwhelming evidence that past efforts to control city growth have been largely ineffective when going against the tide of economic development, some cities and countries have begun to look towards the future and focus their efforts on making the big cities work. Even if all three strategies reviewed above were co-ordinated and sustained, and if policies to promote intermediary cities and small towns were to prove more successful than past efforts, the mega-cities of the Third-World will still contain the vast bulk of its future populations.

Therefore, urban leaders have begun to accept this reality and shift their efforts from preventing urban growth towards planning for it, coping with it and taking advantage of it. This means dealing constructively with the so-called "informal sector," composed of cityward migrants, squatters and low-income urban residents who are both the fastest growing and largest population of most of these cities.

A major policy shift is already underway in this direction. Efforts of the 1960s and early 1970s to control cityward migration and remove squatter settlements began giving way to more accommodation-oriented policies in the mid-1970s and have been increasingly accepted by local and national governments and international agencies in the 1980s.

This change in approach was in part a pragmatic response to the costly failure of squatter-removal and public-housing relocation efforts which nearly bankrupted governments due to the impossibility of cost recovery from the target population. But it was also a response

to a fundamental paradigm shift which turned planning on its head by showing that the unsightly squatter settlements were "not the problem but the solution."<sup>32</sup>

The hallmark date of this shift in practice was 1972 when the World Bank began its first sites and services project of 14,000 lots in Dakar, Senegal, laying out housing lots on undeveloped land and providing basic infrastructure (water, sanitation and electricity) while permitting the occupants to build their houses through self-help and mutual aid at their own pace from whatever materials were available.<sup>33</sup> The revolutionary step was allowing the low-income residents to participate with their government and the World Bank in finding a solution to their needs.

This began a transformation in attitude and practice that is now widely known and is well documented in the 1985 HABITAT document. This report points out that the World Population Plan of Action in 1974 showed a strong anti-urban bias and referred to the "undesirable consequences of excessive migration" and the "harmful effects of the urban way of life." One decade later the HABITAT report acknowledges that urbanization confers substantial social and private benefits, that it is complementary with rural development because it absorbs the population growth, that it raises per capita incomes nationwide and that more funds should flow both nationally and from bilateral and multinational aid sources into coping with urban problems.

Along with this new line of thinking, local participation, self-help housing and fostering the "informal economy" became the hallmarks of enlightened urban policy.

Within this framework, the successfully-used approaches which allow for cost recovery and which could be adapted and replicated in many of the mega-cities include:

#### A INFORMAL SECTOR HOUSING STRATEGIES

1. land tenure for squatters
2. on-site upgrading of squatter settlements
3. serviced sites often with a "hydraulic wall"
4. lowered housing standards, codes and zoning regulations such that informal sector housing can have legal standing
5. land management policies including government land-banking and measures to prohibit private speculation on vacant lands
6. financial mechanisms for small-scale housing loans to the poor either in cash or chits for building materials
7. creation of co-operatives for tools, equipment and building materials so as to lower the per household cost of construction
8. training and technical assistance, often in connection with university students of agricultural and engineering schools

9. site provision for "social infrastructure" including schools, community buildings, open space and places of worship.
- 10 reception or information centers which serve as a base-point for newly-arrived migrants

B. INFORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT

1. legalization of street hawkers and vendors, particularly food vendors
2. permits for outdoor crafts markets, produce markets and street fairs
3. acceptance of front-room stores in residential areas to encourage small-scale capital accumulation
4. appropriate credit mechanisms for small low-interest loans to local entrepreneurs
5. encouragement of cottage industry with improved linkages for purchase of raw materials and distribution of products
6. permits for pedicabs, jeepneys, jitneys and other forms of para-transit
7. acceptance of urban farming in open spaces (including vacant lands under power lines and alongside transportation routes
8. legitimizing and paying for scavengers and garbage collectors (who separate the solid waste stream) through city purchase of materials for composting, recycling and/or energy production
9. technical assistance and training for those wishing to open their own small business or expand an existing small enterprise
10. promoting neighbourhood and citywide schemes to advertise for services needed and service providers looking for work including a range from bicycle or T.V. repair to taking care of an elderly person

These "accommodationist" measures stem from government recognition that, as Laquian put it, "migrants were more realistic than planners and left to their own devices found accommodation, jobs, food and urban services."<sup>35</sup> The role of the government or international agency became to remove major obstacles or impediments to the coping strategies of the urban poor and to facilitate the multiplier effect of their efforts.

The Kampung Improvement Project (K.I.P.) in Indonesia and the Zonal Improvement Project (Z.I.P.) in the Philippines are Asian examples of this overall approach. Neither has incorporated all of the elements listed above but they have demonstrated that neighbourhood upgrading and community development approaches reach more people and are more cost effective and politically palatable than the squatter removal and public housing approach. In Latin America, Peru was the first country

to change the official name of its Lima squatter areas from the pejorative term "invasions" to "pueblos juvenes" in recognition of the fact that when not harrassed by public officials, the residents used their own resources and ingenuity to build up respectable working class neighbourhoods with electricity, running water, paved roads, schools, lively local commerce, and self-supporting transportation links to job markets. National Housing Banks in both Brazil and Mexico have been experimenting with "popular housing projects" including serviced sites and squatter upgrading.

This set of enlightened accommodationist policies has been supported by the World Bank in the past decade. Between 1972 and 1982, it loaned more than \$2 billion to some 36 governments financing 62 urban projects of 4 types: urban shelter, urban transport; "integrated urban projects: and metropolitan development.<sup>36</sup>

However, the amount of spending for urban needs is still exceedingly small compared to total lending. The World Bank's urban project did not exceed 4% of total annual lending (the bulk going to agriculture, energy and industry). And Habitat International's analyses of loans and grants from 15 multi-national agencies from 1965 through 1979 find that less than 2% had been allocated for sites and services, urbanization or squatter upgrading and 5% for water supply and sanitation.<sup>37</sup>

The amount of money needed to deal with the urban needs or "social deficit" of third world cities as an accommodationist strategy is considerable but not beyond question. Not only internationally but domestically, the backlog is partially a function of the existing allocation of resources. Fiscal reforms could change the picture. As Sachs points out:

"The "social deficit" of Sao Paulo could be eliminated by the end of the century by spending 4.4% year of the GNP generated in that city. This may be politically difficult to achieve as it would call for trebling the present budget, but in economic terms is not infeasible in such a wealthy city."<sup>38</sup>

#### D. Positive Impacts of Urban Growth

To begin devising a more effective and appropriate set of strategies for dealing with urban population growth in the developing world requires a reassessment of the actual effects of rural-to-migration as they have appeared in numerous developing countries. Until now, both policy makers and analysts of urbanization patterns have placed a great deal of emphasis on its negative consequences for individuals, urban and rural areas, and developing countries, while neglecting many of its actual and potential benefits.

### Benefits for Individuals

The economic benefits derived by individual migrants from rural-to-urban movement have been well documented. Studies in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Tanzania and South Korea all show that at least 65% of migrants usually find a job within one month. (See Table 4).<sup>39</sup>

In addition, ILO studies have pointed out that in terms of employment, incomes, and productivity, the large size cities are better than the small ones. They found that:

1. "Above 1 million inhabitants, the diversity and types of employment no longer increase but the number of job opportunities is greater in big cities, even in those with 2 million people or more due primarily to the employment of women in the booming service sector, which is a female stronghold.
2. At each doubling of the size of cities there is an increase in the region of 1 to 2 percent in real incomes.
3. "As regards industrial productivity, it appears that this too rises with city size, but tends to reach its maximum in those with around 2 to 3 million inhabitants."<sup>40</sup>

Although unemployment rates are usually listed as high for many urban areas, "informal" sector employment is generally not accounted for. The vast majority of new urban entrants find work of some sort. Indeed, studies in Santiago, Chile have shown that unemployment was higher among native urbanites than among migrants.<sup>41</sup> In addition, income earned from employment in cities usually exceeds income from work in rural areas. Economic rewards are, however, only a small part of the total individual benefits earned by migrants to major cities. Equally important for individuals is the opportunity for upward social mobility in cities vis-a-vis rural areas due, in part, to the economic conditions and rigid social traditions prevalent in many of the latter areas. When individuals are allowed to pursue their interests with a wide range of choice and flexibility, the frequent result is an increase in personal initiative, industriousness, productivity and social bonding -- in short, a process of "human development." This may be especially true for female migrants who often gain access to greater personal freedom, educational opportunities, positions in the labour force, etc. in metropolitan areas. By permanently living in cities, individuals and couples also improve their level of opportunity for their children.

In all of these ways, rural-to-urban migration provides positive consequences for those people involved. This is not to suggest that migrants will not undergo a difficult or prolonged period of adjustment to urban life -- they often do. Nor does this imply that it is not psychologically difficult for people to move from the villages where



they have lived all their lives, for this may also be the case. Nevertheless, since most migrants to cities will experience some of the above benefits, greater acknowledgment should be made by policy makers of the positive features of urban life.

Urban Areas: One cannot deny that major cities themselves have benefited in some ways from rural-to-urban migration despite the common perception that additional migrants put a strain on urban services. Migrants often bring with them many features -- organizing skills, education and training, construction skills, friends -- which contribute positively to urban development if allowed to do so. In fact, cities themselves are frequently built by migrants as they fill in swamps, develop hillsides, and extend housing and electrical facilities. The availability of surplus labour can help city governments and businesses control wages. More importantly, there is evidence that large metropolitan areas have not yet reached their optimal size, and that a constant flow of migrants to major cities will result in increasing rates of production.<sup>42</sup> In short, as the World Bank noted in its World Development Report 1984, "urban growth gives rise to economies of scale."<sup>43</sup> Finally, migrants can perform a demanded function in large cities -- that of performing services as an "informal" sector for the "formal" and "modern" sectors of urban society.

The crucial determinant of the advantages enjoyed by cities from continued in-migration may be the "quality" of the migrants, the most highly motivated and upwardly mobile segment of the rural population. Although Laquian has noted that migrants are increasingly coming from unskilled segments of rural labour, this in no way means that these migrants will become marginalized once they are in urban areas.<sup>44</sup> One can conclude that the major cities in developing countries can reap enormous benefits from the many skilled and educated migrants that are continuously arriving from rural areas and that the ambition and hard work of the many more "uneducated" migrants can be equally beneficial, if encouraged by governments.

Rural Areas: The negative consequences of rural out-migration on the rural areas have been discussed to the point of exhaustion. Of course, there is some truth to the notion that rural areas suffer declines in potential productivity with the permanent loss of young adults and skilled personnel whose upbringing was "subsidized" by the rural economies. With more certainty, we know that cultural norms and family and community ties can be broken by migration to cities, causing hardship for rural residents. However, several actual and potential benefits should also be emphasized. Migration to urban areas can serve as a safety valve to check rural population growth and to provide seasonal employment for migrant labourers when no jobs are available in the countryside. It also allows discontented people who may pose a threat to political stability in rural areas to escape. Rural areas are major benefactors of remittances by migrants, especially from those

who have only recently moved. Finally, one could argue that if new urbanites who gradually gain access to decision making, innovative skills, and capital maintain their ties to rural families, communities and properties, they can help address and balance rural-urban inequality. In effect, rural-to-urban migration could potentially be an effective tool in raising rural standards of living to the levels enjoyed in urban areas.

Developing Countries: Urban growth through migration can also help third-world countries achieve their development goals. The benefits listed for individuals and urban and rural areas will also affect countries positively. Nations that desire to lower their population growth (e.g., many Asian countries) can use migration to major urban centers as a tool towards this end since the evidence is clear that new urbanite couples will lower their total fertility relative to rural residents after some lag time due to greater access to family planning services, greater employment for women, adoption of urban values, higher standards of living and other factors. Furthermore, there are indications that national urban growth usually result in a growth in national per capita income -- a clear indicator of economic development.

Most governments in developing countries give high priority to industrialization and modernization as important elements of their national development. In this regard, the benefits of urban growth especially need to be weighed against the drawbacks. As the World Bank notes, large cities provide savings for industries in communications and transport costs by concentrating suppliers and customers, and they may help to accelerate the pace of technological innovation. On the basis of the evidence reviewed in this section, it seems reasonable to conclude that urban growth should be less often perceived as a trend that must be curbed and more frequently seen as a condition that can be exploited in national development efforts.

### III. URBAN POPULATION ISSUES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

#### A. Nature of Urban Population Problems in the North

The developed nations of the world view their urban problems related to population growth and distribution in a very different light from Third World countries. In most of the industrialized countries, the historic shift of the population from rural farming to manufacturing and service employment in towns and cities is almost completed.<sup>46</sup> It began during the period of industrialization in the 19th century and, in most countries, reached its final climax in the decades following World War II.<sup>47</sup> The impact of this profound structural transformation -- still so critical to the future of most cities of the South -- has already been felt and, in large measure, absorbed by the cities of the North.

Some of the population-related problems faced by Northern cities still stem from this rural-to-urban transformation. But many of the major difficulties facing Northern cities today are not residual problems of past rural-urban migration. They arise from new social, economic and demographic forces -- forces that, in fact, are linked to migration flows in Third World countries.

This section of the paper reviews these urban population problems in developed countries and summarizes efforts to solve them.

Four major trends related to urbanization and population change in the nations of the North will be examined:

##### 1. Continued Urbanization/Rural Decline

In a small number of countries, the urbanization process is not yet completed, giving rise to congestion and other growth problems in their cities. At the same time, the loss of population from rural areas in these and in other, more industrialized countries has caused labour shortages and economic decline and hardship in rural areas.

##### 2. Regional Imbalances

Most developed countries perceive regional imbalances of population to be a problem. Concentration of industry and population in some regions has led to unwanted stagnation and population loss in other regions.

##### 3. Suburban Growth/Declining Central Cities

During the last decade, high rates of suburban growth in most developed countries have placed serious planning and growth

management demands on areas adjacent to cities. In an increasing number of these countries, the central cores of the larger cities are experiencing population loss, along with serious inner city social and economic decline.

#### 4. Population Turnaround/New Rural Growth

Recently, in the most fully industrialized countries a migration "turnaround" has developed. Suburban as well as urban populations are beginning to disperse to outlying areas, accelerating the decline of central cities and placing new demands on rural localities.

Governments of developed countries have adopted a variety of policies to modify the first three of these trends. The fourth trend is not yet seen as a problem requiring action in most countries, although it is being closely monitored by policy makers. Table 5 summarizes the status of national concern about these problems. This table is compiled from summaries of government responses to the Fifth Population Inquiry conducted by the United Nations Secretariat<sup>48</sup> and from a report issued by the Group on Urban Affairs of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).<sup>49</sup>

#### B. Continued Urbanization/Rural Decline

##### 1. Policies to Restrict In-Migration to Cities

In most Eastern European, some Scandinavian and many Southern European nations, the process of urbanization is still somewhat behind that of the rest of the industrialized world. Agriculture remains a major sector of the economy in most of these countries, including all of the Eastern European nations, as well as Iceland, Finland, Norway, Ireland, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain in the West.<sup>50</sup> As shown in Table 5, most of these nations want to restrict future flows of people from the countryside to the cities and maintain adequate population in rural areas to support agricultural production and stem rural decline. Their purpose in pursuing these policies often is as much to re-populate or at least stabilize rural areas as it is to reduce migration pressures on their cities.<sup>51</sup>

Eastern European nations in particular have implemented policies to restrict the growth of their major cities. All of the policy approaches reviewed earlier for developing countries have been utilized.<sup>52</sup>

- X limiting job creation
- X limiting housing
- X rationing of food
- X restricting urban services
- X restricting access to cities

As in Third World countries, only rarely have these policies achieved the degree of control that was intended.<sup>53</sup> In the case of the USSR, extensive evidence shows that such controls have failed to significantly stem urban growth.<sup>54</sup> In other Eastern European nations, somewhat greater success has been achieved in stabilizing rural populations, but with a few exceptions, such as Czechoslovakia (Prague) and Hungary (Budapest), these policies failed to stem the growth of urban areas.<sup>55</sup>

In the case of Prague and Budapest, where some degree of success was attained, controls on in-migration to these cities were coupled with much broader, well co-ordinated policies to disperse migrating populations to other areas of the country. While such "two-sided" strategies that combine rural and regional development with policies designed to restrict urban growth do not necessarily guarantee success -- they failed to halt growth in Moscow, London or Paris in the 1960's<sup>56</sup> -- they have been more effective than individual policies or a piecemeal strategy.<sup>57</sup> The growth of the greater Paris region, for example, was finally halted in the 1970's in part due to a broad, multifaced set of policies that discouraged industrial and population growth in the Paris basin while encouraging it in selected "growth pole" cities (see Section II.C.I. below).<sup>58</sup>

But even where co-ordinated, two-sided strategies have been aggressively applied, the evidence suggests that they are effective only when broader social and economic forces in a country favour a reduction in urbanization trends. Despite strong earlier efforts to halt growth (including, in the case of London and Paris, direct restrictions on industrial construction) success in stemming urban growth in such diverse places as Stockholm, Sweden, Paris, France, and London, England, was only achieved at a time when urban growth was spontaneously coming to an end in these and other highly industrialized countries.<sup>59</sup> The countries with strong urban migration restriction policies in place were able to accelerate this trend when it appeared, but not to initiate it.<sup>60</sup>

The greatest success has been achieved, not in halting city growth, but in spreading it out among adjacent suburban areas or dispersing it to other urban centers (see Section III.C.I. below). Numerous developed countries have adopted the strategy of reducing congestion and other problems of central city growth by directing growth away from the core city to the peripheries around the core. This strategy has been successful not only in Hungary and Poland<sup>61</sup>, but also in Tokyo, and in Paris, London, Stockholm and several other European cities that sought to reduce urban congestion by promoting the development of satellite towns around cities, along with means for commuters to travel to jobs in the city proper.<sup>62</sup> Here, too, rather than going against the prevailing economic and migratory trends, these policies acted in a direction parallel to the suburbanization trends already under way in most developed countries.

With the emergence of suburbanization as a congestion problem in its own right and the associated loss of population in many central cities (see Section II.D below), in recent years most developed countries have abandoned such efforts to promote satellite town development or disperse their urban populations.<sup>63</sup>

## 2. Policies to Stem the Decline of Rural Areas

Both the USSR and other Eastern European nations, where appreciable rural-to-urban migration is still taking place, and many Western European countries, which have largely completed the urbanization process, have sought to maintain agricultural employment and stabilize populations in rural areas by increasing amenities and infrastructure in these areas.<sup>64</sup> Highways and railroads, schools, hospital and health centers, and cultural facilities have been constructed in rural areas. Water and land reclamation projects have been undertaken, and budgets for services have been vastly increased.<sup>65</sup>

But unfortunately, most of these national rural development efforts have failed to stem the decline of rural areas. Indeed, as described in Section II for developing countries, in some cases they appear to have facilitated rural out-migration. Despite a national commitment to rural development in the USSR, the proportion of people living in rural areas declined by 7% between 1961 and 1970 and by another 6% between 1971 and 1980.<sup>66</sup> Extensive rural development programs in Sweden to stem the decline of the Norrland (northern forested region) and in Italy to stem the decline of the Mezzogiorno (the southern region) failed in their objectives of halting population loss and reversing economic deterioration in these areas.<sup>67</sup>

The Italian effort, in particular, reveals how stubborn the basic forces of underdevelopment in some areas and industrialization in other, wealthier parts of the country can be:

(Over 20 years the Government) had committed over \$15 billion to stimulate investment projects of over \$24 billion, built 35 dams to store 2 billion cubic meters of water, reconditioned 20,000 miles of roads and highways, built or enlarged 21 seaports, reclaimed more than 2 million acres of land and irrigated nearly a million, financed 84,000 hotel rooms, 300 vocational training schools, 133 agricultural institutes and schools and 71 hospitals, and raised the level of extraordinary spending in the South -- that is, over and above the normal expenditures of the regular departments -- to over 1% of the gross national product. Yet the disparities between Italy's two economies had not notably diminished.<sup>68</sup>

A new form of assistance to rural areas which may be more successful has recently been launched in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. It involves the development of an innovative form of industry, termed agro-industrial complexes: combinations of modernized agriculture and livestock management, localized food processing and distribution centers, and localized industry to manufacture the equipment and capital goods in support of these activities.<sup>69</sup> This approach seeks to create a new economic counterweight in depressed regions to the pull of growing service employment in the more developed, urbanized regions.

Perhaps this approach will provide a new means of reigniting economic and social development in rural areas. But thus far, as found in Section I for developing countries, in the industrialized nations of the North neither efforts to restrict the growth of cities nor efforts to develop rural areas have been effective in stemming the loss of population from rural areas or in preventing the process of urbanization -- notwithstanding decades of commitment by various governments to achieve this objective.

### C. Regional Imbalances

For Italy, much more is at stake in the Mezzogiorno than stemming rural decline. The southern region of the country had been essentially bypassed during the industrialization of Italy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Wealth and population have been concentrated in the northern, industrialized regions, while population loss and economic decline grew worse with each passing decade in the south.

Such regional imbalances exist in most developed countries. To some extent, as in Italy's southern Mezzogiorno region, they are a consequence of the profound changes that occurred during the industrialization of these countries during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

But to an ever increasing degree, such as is now being demonstrated in Italy's previously prosperous but now declining northern manufacturing centers, new regional imbalances are beginning to develop as a consequence of new forces, forces that are deeply connected to the powerful growth of cities in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

The new forces are part of the structural transformation of the global economy sometimes referred to as the "deindustrialization"<sup>70</sup> of the North. Manufacturing, mining, timber, and other labour-intensive modern industries are increasingly being transferred to the countries of the South -- where labour costs and other factors of production are radically lower. At the same time, the developed country economies are shifting much more extensively to reliance on scientific research, the development of new technologies, information processing and management, business consulting, law, finance, and a host of other service industries.<sup>71</sup>

## 1. Stimulation of Growth in Depressed Regions

Stimulation of growth in depressed regions has taken two forms, general assistance to entire regions and more targeted aid to particular areas within such regions. The targeted approach entails the selection of particular areas within depressed regions that appear to possess economic promise. Economic assistance is then concentrated in these areas.

Most countries have evolved a broad set of regional assistance policies that include both general assistance and targeted assistance.<sup>77</sup> Strong political pressures from localities in depressed areas favour general, across-the-board aid, and most governments respond to this by providing schools, medical facilities and transportation infrastructure. But experience in a wide range of countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands, has shown that even with decades of investment of large amounts of funds and government effort for such general aid, overall redevelopment of declining regions has been virtually impossible to achieve except in cases where the prevailing economic and demographic forces favoured such development.<sup>78</sup>

In fact, the untenably high costs of investing in all communities have led most countries to apply the majority of their aid to selected targets:

- o major cities can be developed as "countermagnets" to the country's primate city;
- o smaller, "intermediate" cities and towns can be selected as development "hubs" in depressed regions;
- o completely new towns can be created and developed to initiate new "growth centers" in declining areas.

All of these targeted approaches have been tried, with mixed results. Numerous studies and evaluations have shown that sustained public investments in industrial relocation to depressed areas (stimulated via grants, loans, subsidies, tax benefits, and local job training programs, coupled with infrastructure investments) can create jobs in these areas.<sup>79</sup> However, these studies have also shown that while decline in such regions may have been buffered, in most cases it could not be halted or reversed.<sup>80</sup> No clearcut advantage of the growth pole countermagnet approach versus the intermediate city approach versus the new town approach have emerged from the experience to-date; all have been successful strategies for dispersing growth in some countries. France, in particular, has used all three of these approaches with some degree of success.<sup>81</sup>



Where successes have been achieved in job creation and economic regeneration, one of the policy elements that has helped has been the deliberate relocation of government agencies and employment to depressed regions. Sweden, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece are among the developed countries that have utilized this policy.<sup>82</sup>

In summary, some countries have been successful in dispersing their urbanized populations away from primate cities to other centers of industrial and population growth. They have not been very successful in directing growth into depressed or underdeveloped rural areas, nor in halting the urbanization process.

#### D. Suburban Growth/Declining Central Cities

Throughout most of the developed world, an accelerating decline of employment and population in the central cities has triggered a rethinking of regional development policies. Rather than drain jobs and people away from cities to rural and less industrialized areas, the focus in many countries has now shifted to maintaining and even attracting industry back to the cities.<sup>83</sup>

This change began to emerge as early as the 1950's and 1960's as the physical layout of Northern cities began to change and the types of people who live in cities began to shift.

Cities prior to the introduction of modern modes of transportation were concentrated spatially. Initially, these spatial patterns reflected the demographic composition of the pre-industrial 18th century city: a population with a pyramidal age structure in which the family was the principal unit of organization. Men were the principal workers. Housing in these cities emphasized family dwellings located in residential neighbourhoods, with commercial and trading facilities typically located in nearby areas to which men would walk to work.<sup>84</sup>

But during the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as industrialization occurred and urban manufacturing and commerce increased, new labour arrived in cities from rural areas and, in some cases, from foreign immigration. The makeup of the urban population shifted. A much higher proportion of single people, first men and later women, began to make up the labour force. Much of the influx of new labour consisted of workers with much lower skills who earned lower incomes. New requirements for housing stock and urban services emerged. Traditional neighbourhoods of family dwellings began to be surrounded by much denser forms of housing for lower income populations.

The advent of railroads, streetcars, and subways triggered decentralization of these highly concentrated urban populations. But it was the widespread availability of the automobile and modern highway

systems following World War II that led huge numbers of middle-income families to move from cities to newly developed suburbs from whence they commuted daily to jobs in the central city.<sup>85</sup> Within the city proper, the proportion of families with children declined, while the proportion of young and old single people, couples without children, and single parents greatly increased. The proportion of middle-income people declined, while the shares of both poor people and wealthy people increased.

This two-century-long reconfiguration of cities -- from spatially compact, compositionally homogeneous, family-centered places to spatially extended, compositionally diverse, and often socially atomized places -- is the hall mark of most cities in the Western world today.

The suburban growth that has resulted from this decentralization of population has placed heavy demands on the planning and management capacities of areas adjacent to major cities. But in most countries the growth has been successfully absorbed. It has been financed mainly through local taxation, combined with comparatively limited provision of public services by local suburban governments. These strategies, in turn, were made possible by the fact that the vast majority of the migrants to suburban areas have been middle-income groups from whom substantial tax revenues can be generated and who are willing to pay privately for many services.

In fact, in most developed countries suburbanization trends have been so persistent and successful in the past 20 years that more and more industrial and commercial activity has also decentralized from the urban core into the suburbs of cities. Secondary and tertiary rings of suburbs have now developed around the cores of many cities.<sup>86</sup>

But the results for the core areas of many cities have been disastrous. The loss of both employment and population has altered the nature of the inner cities. The modern city is increasingly being composed of two parts: an inner city inhabited mainly by poor and by wealthy people and a gigantic suburban ring inhabited mainly by middle-income people. The consequence has been urban decline: "the spatial concentration in large cities of social, economic, and environmental problems, such as high levels of unemployment and poverty, housing deterioration, and decay of the urban infrastructure."<sup>87</sup>

Urban decline has not occurred in all developed countries, nor in all cities in those countries where it is a problem. Rather, it appears to occur mainly in highly industrialized settings where a structural loss of industry is taking place.<sup>88</sup> Such changes are sometimes linked to shifts of industry and jobs between regions within a country. More often today they reflect shifts in industry from developed countries to the Third World, as described earlier for such cities as Pittsburgh, Manchester, Liege and Essen.

Beginning with the civil unrest and riots that occurred in impoverished areas of inner cities in the United States in the late 1960's, governments in North America and Europe have sought ways to eliminate urban poverty and revitalize cities that were experiencing urban decline. Four major strategies have been tried:

Programs to reduce urban poverty  
economic development efforts  
physical renewal of urban centers  
neighbourhood revitalization programs

1. Programs to Reduce Urban Poverty

Increasingly, poverty has become an urban problem in developed nations. In 1959 in the United States, for example, the poverty rate of cities was only half that of rural areas, but by 1978 the rate in cities had become 14% higher than that in rural areas.<sup>89</sup>

In recognition of this growing poverty in the inner cities, a number of developed countries in Western Europe and North America have developed very extensive programs to counter these trends. These programs have generally included direct income assistance to the poor and the unemployed, housing assistance, and a variety of subsidized health, educational, legal and other services. In the United States in 1980, over 20% of the total federal budget was allocated to such "poverty" programs (this includes aid to rural as well as urban inhabitants, but does not include social security or federal employee retirement expenditures).<sup>90</sup> But despite large outlays for such programs, inner city poverty in the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, and some other developed countries remains a serious social problem.

This has led to the development of more targeted programs to help the poor "help themselves." These programs emphasize vocational education and job training, as well as community action programs. The U.S. "War on Poverty" conducted from 1964 to 1974 and the later initiation of community development block grants for low-income neighbourhoods cities are examples. Such targeted programs often are combined with job creation programs in which subsidized public sector employment is provided to graduates of job training programs.

But even these massive, very expensive undertakings have not substantially reduced poverty in most cities suffering from urban decline.<sup>91</sup> In the U.S., despite expenditures of well over \$100 billion per year on direct income transfer and in-kind payments to both the urban and the rural poor, overall poverty increased from 12% to nearly 15% of the national population between 1929 and 1982. As noted in a recent report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),

the characteristics of the population of inner urban areas... include low skills, ethnic minority status (with the possibility of discrimination), poor educational qualifications, low mobility (either for travel to work or migration to a job elsewhere). The groups primarily affected (by unemployment) are youth (especially children of guest workers), single parent families, and older workers.<sup>93</sup>

## 2. Economic Development Efforts

A major feature of urban decline is the loss of inner city jobs which perpetuates poverty by creating high levels of unemployment and which, in turn, erodes the fiscal integrity of cities; New York City, for example, narrowly avoided bankruptcy in 1975 following the loss of nearly 500,000 jobs during the preceding five year period.<sup>94</sup> London lost 40% of its manufacturing jobs between 1961 and 1975.<sup>95</sup>

To counteract the devastating consequences of such loss of industry and jobs, governments have invested heavily in economic development in core urban areas. The principal mechanisms have been job training programs for inner city residents, job creation programs, and a variety of incentive programs to induce private firms to relocate in inner city areas. Among the latter have been "enterprise zones", grants for site improvements and upgrading of infrastructure, concessional loans to companies willing to relocate, payment of relocation expenses, provision of new public services, and various tax subsidies.<sup>96</sup>

The impact of these different mechanisms for stimulating inner city economic development in different countries has been mixed. Job training and vocational training programs to upgrade the skills of workers have been effective in some settings, and these programs have been a central element in most economic regeneration efforts. Studies indicate that workers who "graduate" from these programs are more successful at finding employment. However, it is unclear whether the programs actually help retain or attract new jobs in economically depressed neighbourhoods.<sup>97</sup> Thus, the positive employment effect may be mainly substitutional or temporary.

Some countries have used public funds to create jobs. While this effectively creates employment, economists have questioned whether the subsidization costs in providing such public sector employment do not outweigh the actual economic benefits.

The creation of new private sector jobs has received high priority in many countries. The catalytic infusion of public resources to trigger new investments by the private sector has become a popular approach in many cities in Europe and the U.S. in recent years. In the U.S., for example, the federal government established an urban

development action grant program in 1977 to enable cities to lower "private costs enough to 'make the numbers come out right' and thus cause private investment to occur."<sup>98</sup>

Some of these efforts have been undertaken under the auspices of formalized "public-private partnerships" in which local government, institutions from the voluntary sector, and private industry join together to address inner city problems. Public-private partnerships are a formal component of urban economic development efforts in great Britain and are common in large cities throughout Europe and the U.S.<sup>99</sup> They have tackled not only economic growth, but education, housing, job training, and other related problems associated with inner city decline.

While many of these partnerships have shown promising results, it is still too early to tell how effective they will be in creating long-term employment for inner-city residents or in the other areas they seek to address.

Enterprise zones are also a relatively new approach to stimulating the relocation of industry to inner city areas. A combination of tax relief, publicly-financed site improvements and public services, abatements in zoning and environmental regulations, and abolishment of minimum wage requirements has been used to create special deregulated, low-tax areas as magnets for business relocation. In the U.S., over 450 cities have activated such enterprise zones, and in England, where the concept was first introduced by economist Peter Hall, about 25 zones are now in operation.<sup>100</sup> A 1985 study in the U.S. found that some 50,000 new jobs had been created as a consequence of enterprise zones in U.S. cities.<sup>101</sup> As in the case of public-private partnerships, more experience will be required to determine the long-term effectiveness of this approach.

### 3. Physical Renewal of Urban Centers

In the decades following World War II, governments throughout the developed world invested heavily in the physical rehabilitation of inner cities. Very large expenditures were made to redesign and rebuild central business districts, to renovate old housing and construct new housing, to improve public transportation systems as well as urban roads, highways, parking and traffic control systems, and to upgrade public utilities and infrastructure. Such planned reinvestment took place in literally thousands of large and small cities throughout Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.<sup>102</sup>

By the 1960's, these efforts to modernize the physical plant of cities began to take on a special urgency in those places where urban decline had become evident. Special physical construction programs were developed to complement the social and economic efforts to reduce poverty and to stimulate economic development in the central cities.

In the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries in particular, "urban renewal" projects were launched during the 1960's and 1970's that focussed on the poverty-stricken, high unemployment, inner-city areas.<sup>103</sup>

Initially, many of these projects were conceptualized as "slum clearance and redevelopment" efforts that demolished old, deteriorated housing stock in entire neighbourhoods and replaced it either with new, publicly financed, low-income housing for the residents or with newly developed commercial areas and public spaces. In Great Britain in the 1960's, as many as 60,000 dwellings were being demolished and cleared annually;<sup>104</sup> in the city of Birmingham alone, nearly 30,000 houses were razed between 1968 and the early 1970's.<sup>105</sup> In the United States 600,000 housing units were demolished by urban renewal agencies in the 1960s and early 1970's.<sup>106</sup>

Despite the dramatic scale of these efforts, however, in most cities they did not solve the problems of "rapid rundown in population and employment" that they were designed to address. The United Kingdom, for example, was forced to adopt a new national "Policy for the Inner Cities" in 1977 in response to the failure of its earlier "Urban Programme," which had combined urban renewal efforts with poverty programs.

Furthermore, by the mid-1960's in virtually every country where the demolition/clearance approach to urban renewal had been used, strong community opposition began to develop.<sup>107</sup> In the U.S., where an estimated 2 million people had been forced to relocate their homes, the national urban renewal program was replaced by a Housing and Community Development program in 1974.<sup>108</sup>

But while the urban renewal approach could not overcome the adverse economic forces that were affecting inner cities and while these programs resulted in a net loss of housing in most of the cities where they were applied, the quality of the newly constructed housing stock was generally improved and central business districts in cities throughout the developed countries were transformed into more modern centers. On these grounds, some observers have claimed that the urban renewal approach set the stage for the more intensive, community based revitalization of inner cities that followed.<sup>109</sup>

#### 4. Neighbourhood Revitalization Programs

In response to the strong criticism of the urban renewal demolition and reconstruction programs of the 1960's, a new focus on inner-city regeneration emerged in the early 1970's. Termed "neighbourhood revitalization", it substituted rehabilitation of existing housing stock for clearance and redevelopment, and it emphasized individual and community action in place of central

government authority and implementation. Instead of the mechanisms of eminent domain, condemnation, and forced relocation of households, governments shifted their policies to tax subsidies and grants designed to encourage individuals and community groups to upgrade existing private housing and community facilities. The investment of private capital by the homeowners and tenants or the local community groups is a vital component of this approach.<sup>110</sup>

By the 1980's, neighbourhood revitalization projects could be found in New York, London, Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Munich, Copenhagen, Vancouver, Sidney and hundreds of other developed country cities.<sup>111</sup> The beneficial impact of these efforts on housing stock has been visible in almost every city where they have been tried. Significant improvements in both housing and surrounding neighbourhoods are evident.

But recent evaluations also demonstrate that one of the principal goals of these projects has not been met. Urban revitalization projects in most cities in both Europe and North America have failed to retain inner city residents or substantially overcome the problems of poverty and unemployment in the neighbourhoods where they are located. Rather, they have "gentrified" these areas by displacing the original residents, who leave the city or move to other impoverished areas within it. The new residents typically have higher incomes, higher educational levels and typically do not include families with children.<sup>112</sup>

In summary, all of the efforts to reverse the decline of central cities to date have met with only modest success at best. A recent review of efforts to stem urban decline in Great Britain provides a sobering view that applies to hard-hit cities in many other countries as well:

On the credit side, the population decline of the inner-city may have moderated. A more stable and balanced population structure may be emerging, with a greater mixture than before of socio-economic, ethnic and housing tenure groups. Also, there are less marked contrasts of population and employment densities from the other areas, compared with a decade ago.....

On the debit side, much of the inner-city situation seems to have worsened, not improved. The economic state has deteriorated, with more unemployment and firm closures. The inner-city seems to have fared worse than the outer parts of the conurbations and the rest of the country. The position of ethnic minorities... has deteriorated, and ... public sector investment, particularly the level of local services, has deteriorated in the inner areas... intractable as ever .<sup>113</sup>

## E. Population Turnaround/New Rural Growth

Exacerbating the inner-city urban decline of the more industrialized developed nations is a new trend sometimes referred to as the "population turnaround." The countries most affected by the new focus of deindustrialization are now experiencing a completely new demographic phenomenon: substantial numbers of people are beginning to move out of both suburban and urban centers to live in the outlying countryside. As a result, for the first time since the start of the great exodus of people from rural areas to the cities in the 19th century, the populations of rural counties are beginning to grow. By the early 1980's, the following developed countries showed distinct evidence of this population turnaround: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Australia, and Japan.<sup>144</sup>

This population turnaround has been made possible by the increased number of service jobs in rural areas, a trend linked both to the structural transformation of Western economies (which is creating more service jobs) and to previous migration from farm to city (which concentrated farming in fewer hands, raising personal income in rural areas, and thereby increasing purchasing power for services). Another driving force behind this trend, at least based on research in the U.S., appears to be the changing age structure of the developed country populations. A major portion of the new rural settlers are retired persons who bring their income with them. Also contributing to the new trend are the revolutions in communications and in transportation systems, which together have brought urban lifestyles to the countryside.

The population turnaround has now been sufficiently documented in a large number of countries and cultures that its reality is indisputable.<sup>115</sup> But the trend is still so new that its future is uncertain. Very recent demographic evidence from the United States and many European countries shows a slowing of the turnaround,<sup>116</sup> giving rise to debate that it may be a short-lived phenomenon, on the one hand, or that it may be the first, hesitant steps of a completely new long-term redistribution of population in post-industrial societies.

## IV. North/South Linkages

### A. Linkages

At first glance, little except an historical time line seems to link the rapid urbanization of Southern nations with post-urbanization trends that prevail in most Northern countries. In the former, cities are being transformed by dynamic growth, while in the latter cities are struggling to counteract urban decline. In the former, people are streaming from rural areas into cities to seek new opportunities for their lives; in the latter, just the reverse is being seen in some countries.



But a second look reveals a striking feature held in common: in almost every city of the South, there exists a prototype city of the North. No matter what the continent or the culture, regardless of political systems or even, to an amazing degree, the levels of development, most major cities in developing countries possess central business districts that duplicate most of the features of Northern cities: modern streets and lighting, modern water, power, and communications system; along with modern skyscrapers, fleets of taxis, banks, restaurants, hotels, and shops, all constructed and operating at standards comparable to those of major cities of the North.

To be sure, these areas often represent very small enclaves within the overall city, and in countries where national levels of development are still low, the infrastructure of this modernized sector may be much thinner than first meets the eye. But clearly they are there: growing centers of offices and business services that much more closely resemble modern Northern cities than either the wider urban areas around them or the towns and villages in the out-lying parts of the country.

The physical similarities reflect a much deeper connection. These modernized business centers within Southern cities, like their counterparts in the North, perform the advanced business functions required for the operation of world markets and trade and the international movement of financial capital. The extraordinary growth of world trade and internationalization of both production and markets since World War II dramatically accelerated North/South economic linkages and, with them, the development of urban financial and commercial centers within the heart of the major cities in most developing countries.

The technologically and physically advanced business centers within Southern cities are the principal linkage points for economic, social and cultural interaction between the whole of the North and the whole of the South. They are the entry points for Northern capital that helps fuel industrialization of the South. They are centers of control and planning (and often even physical shipment) for the export of goods destined for Northern (as well as other Southern) markets. They serve as the vital interface between the rest of their country and the outside world for all forms of trade and commerce.

To the extent that international trade and capital transfers are necessary for industrialization and economic development in the Third World -- and most observers think they are vital -- the wellbeing of most Southern nations is strongly tied to the growth and fortunes of these modernized business centers within their major cities.

But the existence of these "cities of the North" within Southern cities has also created great disparities in wealth and poverty, status, and wellbeing in these cities. One of the greatest challenge facing leaders and planners in Third World cities is how to integrate the modernized business center and the people whose lives are dependent on it with the rapidly growing much larger city that surrounds it.

Leaders in the industrialized Northern countries have a deep stake in this problem. To the extent that international trade and capital transfers are necessary for economic growth and wellbeing of the Northern countries--again, most observers think they are crucial--the destiny of Northern nations and Northern cities will depend upon the success or failure of the cities of the South to perform their essential linkage function. For this reason, it is in the interests of the North to help the cities of developing countries to accommodate their burgeoning populations with housing, employment and services and to avoid the emergence of self-perpetuating enclaves of rich and poor, modernized and underdeveloped areas within Southern cities.

## B. Conclusions

The most powerful help that Northern nations can provide Southern nations faced with rapid urbanization and urban growth is encouragement of the widespread industrialization that is now emerging in the developing world. Such industrialization will bring with it the modernization and income needed by Third World cities to cope with their tremendous demands and growth problems.

To bring this about, there will need to be continued capital investment by the North in countries of the South, coupled with continued expansion of world trade.

This, in turn, will result in very real costs from "deindustrialization" in the North. The Northern cities will continue to face major adjustments in this process. As the size and composition of their populations change in response to structural changes in the pattern of industry and employment, more and more cities in the North will begin to face the urban decline phenomenon. The two-tier rich-poor problems faced now by cities like New York, London and Paris in the most highly industrialized countries are likely to become much more widespread throughout the developed world. Therefore, there is an urgent need to devote more resources to the study and amelioration of these problems. Cities need to exchange information about their programs that address inner city problems. Nations governments in the developed nations must be helped to understand that the roots of urban problems lie well outside the cities and that national revenues will be needed in very significant amounts to help find ways of solving these problems.

More broadly, the developed countries need to find new approaches to facilitating their own development as post-industrial economies and societies--and Northern cities need to accept and establish their new and emerging roles as post-industrial cities.

Perhaps the most striking aspect to date of government efforts to stimulate economic development in both cities and declining regions has been the almost single-minded focus of these programs on attracting industry, especially manufacturing industry, to relocate and settle in the inner city or the depressed region. In a time of increasing "deindustrialization" of the developed world, this strategy is becoming both increasingly difficult and increasingly counterproductive, as major cities and industrialized regions begin to lose their industry to foreign countries.

What are the new, forward-looking strategies developed countries should adopt in place of the old approaches? What is a post-industrial city? No one yet knows, but it is evident from the entire history of policy interventions reviewed in this paper that efforts to hold back or reverse the evolution of Northern cities will fail. Urban leaders and planners in the North need to discover the new functions demanded by the emerging post-industrial societies around them, and then guide their cities toward the fulfillment of these functions.

In the developing countries, successful industrialization will hardly solve urban problems. In fact, it will almost certainly speed up the rate of urbanization. Even if birth rates decline, there is likely to be a continuing stream of unprecedented numbers of people migrating to the cities for the next 50 to 100 years. The problems of absorption and accommodation are gargantuan.

Hopefully, economic growth and industrial development will provide the revenues necessary to construct the housing and infrastructure, and provide the services, that will be required. The cities of the South should take note that their current rates of growth are no higher than those that prevailed in some of the major cities of Europe and the U.S. during the 19th century--rates that lasted over several decades. Current levels of technology are much higher than existed then, and present-day transportation and communication systems make possible a widely dispersed suburban population, which was not feasible in that period.

But despite such optimistic considerations, there is widespread concern, even alarm, about the prospects of Third World cities for meeting the demands they will face. Good economic growth in the developing countries will not be a sufficient answer to these concerns.

International aid organizations must be encouraged to increase their "urban bias." Given the needs of Southern cities and the fact that the majority of poor people in the world will soon live in cities rather than in the countryside, the focus of multinational aid programs needs to be readjusted. (As of 1986, only 8% of all such funds were channeled to urban projects and programs).

At the national level, urban bias needs to be applied to national government spending as well. Furthermore, national development goals and plans must take urban growth and planning much more into account. One way to achieve this might be to develop urban impact statements to assess the consequences of such national economic policies as taxation, tariffs, industrial investments, food and fuel pricing, and transfer payments on the present and future wellbeing of cities. Another way would be to redraw urban boundaries so that they include entire metropolitan regions. This allows for better planning, better use of scarce resources, and more equitable distribution of appropriation and tax collection.

Much greater political commitment to urban problems is needed by national governments in Third World countries. Mayors and city managers need to develop a stronger voice at the national policy level. This means that new Ministries of Urban Affairs and Development, as well as national political associations such as the Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities in the U.S., should be established where they do not yet exist.

Finally, there is a great need for improved information exchange and other mechanisms to help city policy makers learn which programs and strategies work and which don't work and to transfer the latest technological advances from city to city across national and regional boundaries.

Agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, and the International Labour Organization should devote a much larger share of their resources to serving as policy analysts and clearing houses of information for cities. Such non-profit organizations as the International Union of Local Authorities, the International City Manager's Association and the International Association of Local Governments could play a critical role in the dissemination of information about "what works" from city to city. More conferences such as this one and the 1987 meeting on "World Cities and the Global Economy" are needed.

The fundamental recommendation of this paper is that leaders and planners carefully diagnose the underlying nature of demographic forces at play in their countries. Realistic policies should be constructed in response to these trends. They need to take into account, more so than in the past, the extent to which major trends can be reversed or halted - or even deflected - and the extent to which they must be accommodated and turned to maximum advantage.

Ultimately the management of the "urban crisis," North or South, is really a question of coping with a new transformation of our worldwide civilization which manifests itself within the cities of both the developed and developing countries. This economic and social transformation, like those before it, brings inevitable chaos and the need for adjustment. Like the Chinese symbol for "crisis," it contains within it both danger and opportunity.

As Norman Myers put it:

There may well be innovative schemes to improve life in cities but nearly all hinge on economic strength and political will.....

TABLE I

Current Policies to Limit Urban Growth in Selected  
Developing Countries

<u>Area</u>	<u>Cityward Migration Policy</u>	<u>Natural Increase Policy</u>
<u>I. Asia:</u>		
<u>China</u>	In the 1980s, a shift in emphasis from restricting in-migration to the promotion of intermediate and small cities, along with a re-definition of urban areas.	Intensive promotion of "single-child" policy, supported by community involvement, government support for contraceptives, legal abortion and sterilization. Goal: zero population growth by the year 2000.
<u>India</u>	Recent emphasis on rural-oriented measures (agricultural development, rural electrification, infrastructure projects) and promotion and medium towns.	Policy to decrease fertility rates through family planning services, information, education and communication programs, financial incentives. Abortion and sterilization performed on request, government support for contraceptives.
<u>II. Africa:</u>		
<u>Nigeria</u>	Policy to slow down rapid growth of Lagos and provide alternative destinations for potential rural migrants of eastern Nigeria. Focus on rural modernization and creation of new national capital.	No current policy to reduce natural increase rate, but government now expressing increased concern over rapid population growth and contemplating policies of intervention to reduce natural increase rate. Sterilization legal and direct government support for contraceptive services.
<u>Kenya</u>	Policies aimed mainly at rural and regional development, with goal of controlling growth of Nairobi.	Long-standing policy to reduce fertility levels, primarily through family planning services. Government support for contraceptives, abortion illegal, and sterilization legal.

Area      Cityward Migration Policy

Natural Increase Policy

III. Latin America and Caribbean:

Brazil      Since 1975, policies have been aimed at guiding investment to medium-sized cities and their hinterlands, and stimulating economic growth in these areas. Also tried new capital (Brasilia), regional development (SUDENE in the Northeast), and massive squatter removal.

No official efforts are made to lower fertility rates, but family planning services and contraceptives are available on a local basis. Abortion illegal.

Cuba      Since the 1970s, government has felt that goals of controlling rural-to-Havana migration have been met.

No policy to control rates, since government feels that rates have already stabilized at satisfactory level. Abortion and sterilization legal, contraceptives widely available.

Mexico      Adopted policy in 1978 to redirect migration flows away from major metropolitan centres and to retain population in selected rural areas.

1978 policy to decrease fertility levels through family planning, sex education, and adjusting economic and social factors. Sterilization legal without conditions and direct government support for contraceptive services since 1973. Abortion illegal.

IV. Middle East

Egypt      Policy to control growth of Cairo, through regional development and creation of new desert cities.

Policy to decrease fertility rates through family planning and reducing infant mortality. Government support for contraceptives. Abortion and sterilization generally restricted.

Saudi Arabia      Policies to disperse population to new towns and industrial zones and to promote rural development.

Rates are considered satisfactory, and there is no government intervention to lower them. Abortion is illegal, access to contraceptives restricted.

Iraq      Policy to control growth of larger cities through development of medium-sized towns and recent construction of satellite towns near Baghdad.

Since middle-1970s, policies aimed at raising fertility rates. Abortion is illegal, no government support for contraceptives.

Table prepared by  
Martin Brockerhoff

TABLE 2

Strategies to Limit Big City Growth: Notable Cases\*

	Restriction			Dispersion				Regional/Rural Development					
	Limit New Jobs	Limit Housing	Food Rationing	Restrict Urban Services	Restrict Access	Growth Poles	Counter-Magnets	New Capitals and Towns	Land Colonization	Ethnic Distribution	Intermediate Cities	Regional Development	Rural Development
<u>Asia:</u>													
China	x	x	x		x				x		x	x	x
India	x				x		x	x		x	x	x	x
South Korea	x	x			x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Indonesia				x					x		x	x	x
<u>Africa:</u>													
Egypt							x	x	x		x	x	x
Algeria	x	x						x	x		x	x	x
Kenya									x		x	x	x
<u>Latin America and Caribbean</u>													
Cuba	x	x	x			x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Mexico	x			x				x	x		x	x	x
Brazil	x					x		x	x		x	x	x
Columbia	x							x	x			x	x



	<u>Limit</u> <u>New</u> <u>Jobs</u>	<u>Limit</u> <u>Housing</u>	<u>Food</u> <u>Ration-</u> <u>ing</u>	<u>Restrict</u> <u>Urban</u> <u>Services</u>	<u>Restrict</u> <u>Access</u>	<u>Growth</u> <u>Poles</u>	<u>Counter-</u> <u>Magnets</u>	<u>New</u> <u>Capitals</u> <u>and</u> <u>Towns</u>	<u>Land</u> <u>Colon-</u> <u>ization</u>	<u>Ethnic</u> <u>Distri-</u> <u>bution</u>	<u>Inter-</u> <u>mediate</u> <u>Cities</u>	<u>Regional</u> <u>Develop-</u> <u>ment</u>	<u>Rural</u> <u>Develop-</u> <u>ment</u>
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Middle East:

Jaudi Arabia	x					x		x	x		x	x	x
Iraq	x					x		x	x		x	x	x
Syria	x										x	x	x
Israel		x						x	x		x		x

Based on data in the U.N. 1983 Monitoring Report

TABLE 3

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND  
RURAL OUT-MIGRATION: A SUMMARY

1. Land reform is expected to have a moderate slowing impact on rural-urban migration because it normally increases labor utilization in rural areas.
2. Land rent ceilings and tenancy controls may lead to tenant evictions and thus may stimulate rural outmigration and possibly contribute to rural-urban migration.
3. Rural resettlement schemes provide opportunities for varying numbers of people; their ability to have a negative impact on rural outmigration depends on the numbers affected and the success of the schemes in retaining settlers.
4. The Green Revolution (promotion of high-yield seeds, fertilizer, etc.) in the absence of tractorization tends to be labor absorbing and therefore may reduce rural outmigration. Rapid increases in production of grains for the market tend to stimulate the growth in market towns and regional centers of agriprocessing, supply of farm outputs, and consumer goods and services. Therefore, through these intersectoral linkages, the Green Revolution may stimulate migration into market towns and regional centers, particularly in the long run.
5. Tractors and related forms of mechanization usually displace labor and thus stimulate rural outmigration and may contribute to rural-urban migration.
6. Irrigation projects increase the demand for agricultural labor and therefore tend to slow rural outmigration and may reduce rural-urban migration.
7. Increased credit and extension services could increase rural output and employment, especially if they reach small farmers, which could slow outmigration. More often the chief beneficiaries are the larger landowners, and this may provide a weak stimulus to rural-urban migration in the long run.
8. Off-farm employment and rural enterprise development tend to generate economic opportunities in small towns. Such activities stimulate rural to small town migration and may retard rural to big city migration in the short run. However, in the long run, migration to large cities may accelerate because small centers often act as a staging ground for rural migrants on their way to large cities.
9. Rural public works projects provide attractive employment opportunities, and therefore have a strong negative impact on rural-urban migration, After project completion the impact may shift to a moderate stimulus to rural-urban migration because public works programs can provide rural workers with the occupational skills and experience needed to gain urban employment.

10. Rural roads projects generate considerable employment during construction; thus they may have a strong slowing impact on rural-urban migration in the very short run. However, upon completion, the improved roads increase rural-urban integration and thus may stimulate rural-urban migration.
11. Rural electrification also increases urban-rural integration and thus may accelerate rural-urban migration. However, electricity can stimulate rural economic activity thus retarding migration. The net impact is probably a weak slowing of migration.
12. Development of rural education may keep some youth and even their families from moving to towns where schools are better. However, formal education provides youth with skills that are far more applicable in cities than in rural areas; consequently, development of formal education provides a very strong stimulus to rural-urban migration. This is perhaps a very strong stimulus to rural-urban migration. This is perhaps the strongest generalization that can be made concerning the impact of rural development activities on migration.
13. Family planning programs which reduce fertility and population pressure on land have a moderate slowing impact on rural-urban migration in the long run.
14. Development of improved rural health services has a mixed and relatively weak impact on rural-urban migration.
15. Most of the expenditures for the rural-oriented activities of international development agencies are made in large, often capital, cities for such items as salaries, office overhead, farm equipment and supplies, and travel. The direct and multiplier impacts of these expenditures generate considerable employment.

From Richard Rhoda  
US.A.I.D. 1979

TABLE 4

City	Sample description	Cumulative percentage finding work within
<u>City-wide samples</u> Santiago, Chile (Herrick (1965))	Economically active migrants who arrived in Santiago within previous decade.	43% Immediately (2 days) 66% 1 month 85% 6 months
Brazil: 6 cities, including Rio and Sao Paulo (Hutchinson (1963))	Adult migrants	Male 85% Female 74% 95% 1 month 90% less than 6 months
Seoul, Korea (Lee(n.d.))	Household heads, of whom 80% are migrants	26% Immediately (prearranged) 64% 'Soon' 76% 6 months Over 75% 3 months
Lima, Peru (OAS (1969))	1967 survey of migrants	
<u>Rural-urban sample</u> Tanzania: urban areas (Barnum and Sabot (n.d.))	Males who moved from rural areas to urban areas after the age of 13	80% 3 months Over 90% 6 months
<u>Poor sections of city</u> Santiago, Chile (ECLA (1963))	Family heads or their wives in a <u>callampa</u> settlement. 85% manual laborers or self-employed artisans	47% 'Immediately' 91% 3 months
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Germani (1958))	Residents of a <u>villa miseria</u> , mostly recent migrants, 61% day laborers or unskilled workers	74% 2 weeks 85% 1 month
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Perlman (1971))	Residents of three favelas: (a) Those with experience in unskilled urban or rural work (b) Those with previous skilled jobs	85% 1 month 65% 1 month

From Lorene Yap, 1973.

TABLE 5

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POLICIES ADOPTED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES<sup>48,49</sup>

	National Policy			
	Limit Urban Growth/Disperse Urban Population	Stem Decline in Rural Areas	Correct Regional Imbalances	Revitalize Central Cities
Austria	-	x	x	-
Australia	x	x	x	x
Austria	-	-	x	x
Belgium	-	-	x	-
Bulgaria	x	x	x	-
Belorussian SSR	x	x	x	-
Canada	-	-	x	-
Czechoslovakia	x	x	x	-
Denmark	-	-	x	x
Finland	x	x	x	-
France	x	x	x	x
West Germany	x	x	-	-
East Germany	-	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	-
Hungary	x	x	x	-
Ireland	-	-	x	-
Ireland	x	x	x	-
Italy	-	x	x	-
Japan	x	x	x	-
Luxembourg	-	x	x	-
Norway	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	x	-	x	x
New Zealand	-	x	x	-
Norway	-	x	x	-
Poland	x	x	x	-
Portugal	-	-	x	-
Romania	x	x	x	-
Soviet Union (USSR)	x	x	x	-
Spain	x	x	-	-
Sweden	-	x	x	x
Switzerland	-	x	x	-
Czechoslovakian SSR	x	x	x	-
United Kingdom	-	x	x	x
United States	-	x	-	x
Yugoslavia	x	x	-	-

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